Winter 2009, Vol. 25, No. 1

Unraveling Judicial Restraint: Guns, Abortion, and the Faux Conservatism of J. Harvie Wilkinson III
by Nelson Lund and David B. Kopel
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Part I of this Essay shows that Judge Wilkinson’s analogy between Roe and Heller is untenable.
Contrary to Judge Wilkinson’s mistaken claim, the genuine conser-vative critique of Roe is based on the Constitution, not on judicial “values.” Judge Wilkinson, moreover, does not show that Heller’s interpretation of the Second Amendment is refuted, or even called into serious question, by Justice Stevens’ dissenting opinion.

Part II shows that Judge Wilkinson himself does not adhere to the “neutral principles” that he claims to derive from “true judicial values.” Under the principle of judicial restraint that Judge Wilkinson articulates, many statutes that he reviles, including the Jim Crow laws of the twentieth century, should have been upheld by the courts. 

The Link between Judicial Independence and Administrative Staffing:
A Reappraisal
by Kyle A. Scott
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This paper will begin with a brief discussion of the theoretical connection between judicial independence and administrative staffing levels, a connection which has been convincingly described by Hanssen (2000, 535). The first section will next develop an alternative hypothesis to counter Hanssen’s judicial independence hypothesis.

The second section of this paper describes and evaluates Hanssen’s variable construction and model specification. The third section presents a replication of Hanssen’s results and the results of the new models. The paper concludes with a revised statement with regard to the connection between administrative staffing levels and judicial independence. 

The Court of Congressional Contempt
by Michael A. Zuckerman
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This Note argues that Congress should again look to its direct power to punish for contempt in an effort to reclaim its role in the political system and restore the effectiveness of the national legislature. Part II focuses on two related and implied powers of Congress: the power to investigate and the power to punish for contempt.

Next, against the backdrop of recent challenges to the contempt power, Part III argues that Congress should in certain cases resort to direct contempt proceedings. Part IV discusses how direct contempt proceedings might operate in a modern Congress and considers three procedures that a modern Congress could employ to carry out the direct power to punish: proceedings before the full chamber of the offended house, proceedings before a committee thereof, or proceedings before a specialized internal congressional tribunal that is termed here the “Court of Congressional Contempt.”